The advent of new vaccines and the changing epidemiology of hepatitis
INTRODUCTION
Hepatitis A virus (HAV) infection is a more prevalent disease but with a less serious self-limited morbidity and a lower disease mortality than that caused by the hepatitis B virus. HAV is an enterically transmitted disease with a worldwide distribution, closely related to the level of economic development and often occurring in epidemic clusters. In many developed and developing countries, disease incidence and prevalence has decreased markedly, due to better general hygienic measures. The age of infection has shifted to older age groups, also related to improving socioeconomic and hygienic conditions and safer water supplies. As expression of clinical disease is highly age-related, the shift of infection to *Department of Epidemiology and Community Medicine, University of Antwerp, Universiteitsplein 1, B-2610 Antwerp, Belgium. qnstitute for Medical Technology Assessment, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands. *To whom correspondence should be addressed older age groups will increase the number of clinical infections.
From epidemiological studies, several groups at high risk for HAV have been recognized. Travellers to endemic regions, whether for tourism or business, run a significant risk of infection with HAV r. Until recently, the only options for prevention were precautionary measures and passive immunization with immunoglobulin. With the development of hepatitis A vaccines, the potential for longer term protection has increased substantially.
Three possible strategies for prevention of HAV infection in travellers are compared: active immunization with the new HAV vaccine; screening for HAV antibodies first and then vaccinating only susceptibles; passive immunization by means of hepatitis A immunoglobulin.
METHODS
The decision-analysis model used to compare each of these three strategies to non-intervention is very similar to the model that Mulley ef ul. used to evaluate hepatitis B prevention strategies?. The aim is to calculate the expected incremental net medical care costs per infection prevented. This means that for each strategy calculation is made as follows: from the additional costs of preventive intervention, the medical care costs saved as a result of prevention are subtracted, and then the total divided by the expected number of hepatitis A infections prevented.
The structure of the decision problem is depicted in Figure   I . It describes the possibilities of becoming infected depending on the strategies chosen and the associated probabilities of immunity and infection. In Figure  2 , the events occurring after the decision to vaccinate are shown. The model is flexible enough to allow for evaluation of both population-wide strategies and strategies targeted at particular risk groups. This evaluation focuses only on travellers.
The calculation of the expected costs and expected numbers of infections under each strategy are dependent on the input data. These are based on the best estimates available in the literature and on epidemiological surveys organized in Belgium.
INPUT DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS

Epidemiology
The target group at risk is assumed to consist of 1000 Belgian travellers to an endemic country. At a mean age of 40 years, the prevalence of HAV antibodies is esti- average monthly attack rate fox" business people and tourists travelling under reasonably good hygienic conditions (R. Steffen, personal communication, 1992) . The annual risk of HAV infection while at home is estimated to be only 0.3%, based on Fr6sner's estimate for Germany ('. In reality, travel patterns are very diverse. For simplicity, we have assumed that all travellers in this target group annually spend a period of 19 consecutive days in an endemic country with a time span of 10 years of travel.
Clinical course of HAV infection
It is well known that the development of symptoms following HAV infection is strongly related to age. We have assumed that at the age of 40, 10% of all infections will be asymptonaatic 7,s. For symptomatic infections, we have distinguished between mild, moderate, severe and fulminant hepatitis ( Figure 3 ). Because it has been suggested that relapse rates vary inversely with the severity of the infection, we have assumed relapse rates of 9, 7 and 2% after a mild, moderate and severe HAV infection respectively "'.~.
Estimated costs of treatment
Calculations of expected costs of treating HAV infections are based on a questionnaire sent to GPs and hepatologists and an analysis of the records of hospitalized patients. Medical care cost data are presented in US$ but reflect Belgian 1991 health-care price levels.
Details of the costings can be found in Tormans ctal.':
Average costs of treating mild, moderate and severe hepatitis were estimated at US$330,420 and 2144 respectively. Due to a lack of case records t\)r patients with fulminant hepatitis A, we have arbitrarily estimated that the costs of treating these patients would be tenfold the costs of treating severe hepatitis. Costs of treating relapsing hepatitis were estimated at US$420. The time span for the model is 10 years and all costs in future years were discounted to their present value using a discount rate of 5%.
INTERVENTION STRATEGIES
Vaccination
This strategy aims at active immunization of the entire target group with HAV vaccine. However, because the vaccine is administered in two doses and a booster (at 0, I and 12 months), compliance -and therefore also protection may be less than complete. We have assumed that 100% will receive the first dose, but only 60% will come for the second dose and 50% for the booster (see Tabh, 1) . The rate and duration of protection with only one dose, with two doses and with the full schedule are estimates based on the currently available evidence on seroconversion rates ~ 3,14.
The costs of vaccination are estimated to be US$24 for one dose plus US$15 administration costs.
Screening and vaccination
To avoid injecting expensive vaccine into immune individuals, screening for HAV antibodies can be considered. The HAV antibody screening test has high sensitivity (99%) and specificity (99%) rates~L Assuming that two visits to a physician are needed to obtain blood and interpret the test results, the total cost of screening per case is estimated at US$43. Compliance to the vaccination schedule for those found susceptible after screening is assumed to be identical to the compliance of those vaccinated without prior screening (see above).
Passive immunization
At present, the recommended prevention strategy for persons travelling to high endemic regions is passive immunization with immunoglobulin. The protection rate is estimated to be 85% ">~ and protection lasts for 3 months. Also, as estimated for active immunization, compliance may be incomplete in the sense that individuals may not always be willing or able to obtain an immunoglobulin injection before each trip. We have estimated compliance at ~ 50% by assuming that the entire target group receives passive immunization for the first five years but not for the next five years. Unit costs for passive immunization, i.e. the purchase and administration of one dose, is estimated at US$41.
RESULTS
For each of the three strategies, the expected number of infections and the expected costs incurred have been calculated using the baseline assumptions. Comparison to the 'doing nothing" strategy allows the computation of S90 Vaccine, Vol. 10, Suppl. 1, 1992 each strategy's cost-effectiveness, i.e. the net medical costs per infection prevented. Table 2 illustrates that the total costs are lowest when no preventative action is taken, but that, on average, 27.7 per 1000 travellers will acquire an HAV infection. Vaccination of all 1000 travellers reduces this number to 12.6 per 1000 at a total net medical expense of US $89 321. It is mainly the imperfect compliance that prevents the infection rate from reaching zero. Screening before vaccination leads to a marginally higher infection rate (12.8 per 1000), mainly because of the 1% false-positive individuals that remain susceptible but are not vaccinated. Also the costs for screening and vaccinating only susceptibles turn out to be higher than for immediate vaccination of the entire group. Finally, passive immunization of travellers yields the highest overall cost and the highest infection rate of the three prevention strategies. The elevated numbers are due to the lower protection rate associated with the immunoglobulin (85%) and to the compliance problem suspected to occur after the fifth year.
Given these costs and effects, it is not surprising that the vaccination strategy yields the lowest cost per infection prevented (US$4880). With the screening strategy, it costs US$5621 to prevent an HAV infection, while the cost-effectiveness ratio for passive immunization is about six times that of the vaccination strategy (US$29 932). Obviously, these baseline results are critically dependent on some of the data assumptions made in the model. The following section explores the sensitivity of these results to changes in the baseline data assumptions. Table 3 presents the effects of the vaccination strategy on the cost-effectiveness ratio (CER) when some of the basic assumptions are varied. First, it is shown that the CER increases when exposure to HAV risk is reduced and vice versa. The costs of preventing HAV infections increase when the travel frequency or the duration of the stay abroad is reduced. Second, it is obvious that vaccination becomes more cost-effective when compliance is higher or the price of the vaccine is lower. The CER is relatively insensitive to the costs of treating HAV infections. Even a tripling of the baseline cost estimates does not reduce the CER in a meaningful way (only 24%). Of greater importance are the estimated prevalence of immunity (which increases the waste of vaccine in non-susceptibles) and the attack rate for a particular travel destination (which increases the risk of infection). It is clear that the availability of more reliable or more specific estimates on each of the parameters can substantially improve the confidence in the baseline cost-effectiveness results. 
Sensitivity analysis
Model extensions
The indirect costs and secondary attack rate data in Table 3 illustrate the effects of two extensions of the basic model. So far we have only been concerned with the direct costs of intervention, i.e. the medical care costs of prevention and treatment. There are, however, also indirect costs associated with HAV infections in terms of work-related losses due to illness. From the responses of GPs and hepatologists, we have estimated the average number of work loss days due to mild, moderate and severe infection. Table 3 shows the cost-effectiveness ratios for vaccination when these work days lost are priced by a low estimate (US$65) and a high estimate (US$194) . Assuming a high cost per day lost, the cost savings as a result of vaccination do not outweigh the costs of prevention.
A second extension of the model deals with the issue of horizontal transmission. It seems fair to argue that the vaccination of these 1000 travellers also prevents an (unknown) number of secondary infections through horizontal transmission to personal contacts. In the baseline model, this secondary attack rate was implicitly assumed to be 0%. It is shown that the CER from vaccination is reduced by > 50% when the secondary attack rate is assumed to be 100%, i.e. when it is assumed that every HAV infected traveller will, on average, transmit the infection to one other person.
Threshold analysis
The cost-effectiveness ranking of the prevention alternatives can vary with the input data assumptions. In particular, the comparison of screening versus vaccination is very sensitive to the prevalence of HAV antibodies in the target population. Figure 4 shows the cost-effectiveness of both alternatives as a function of the prevalence of immunity. It can be seen that above the immunity threshold level of 55%, screening becomes more cost-effective than vaccination, keeping all other assumptions constant. This kind of threshold analysis can be useful in the search for the most cost-effective HAV prevention strategy for different target groups.
CONCLUSIONS
By means of a decision-tree-based model, the cost-effectiveness was analysed of three HAV prevention strategies Threshold analysis for the prevalence of HAV antibodies.
• , Vaccination; +--+, Screening for travellers to countries with high endemicity was analysed. Vaccination proved to be more cost-effective than the currently recommended passive immunization. However, vaccination does not save health-care costs. Under the baseline assumptions, the net cost per infection prevented is estimated at US$4880. The baseline cost-effectiveness ratios vary substantially with input data assumptions about travel behaviour, compliance with the immunization schedule and risk exposure, but are relatively insensitive to HAV infection treatment costs. Extending the model, by taking into account indirect costs and secondary attack rates through horizontal transmission, reduces the cost per infection prevented but does not make prevention a cost-saving item. Screening for HAV antibodies and then vaccinating susceptibles only becomes a more cost-effective strategy at high prevalence rates of immunity. Further investigation is required on some of the crucial input parameters to the model to increase the reliability of the outcomes and to extend its usefulness to the evaluation of HAV prevention strategies for other risk groups than travellers.
